•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

SSC98-X-3
Lessons Learned from the
Miniature Sensor Technology Integration (MSTI) -3 Controlled Reentry
Lesley M. Rahman
AlliedSignal, Inc.
7515 Mission Drive
Lanham, MD 20706
301-805-3638
Lesley.Rahman@AlliedSignal.com
Preston S. Diamond
ANSER
1215 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Ste 800
Arlington, VA 22202
703-416-3434
DiamondS@ANSER.org
Todd C. Probert
AlliedSignal, Inc.
One Bendix Road
Columbia, MD 21045
410-964-7249
Todd.Probert@AlliedSignal.com
Abstract. This paper is presented as an overview of the lessons learned from the controlled
reentry of the Air Force Miniature Sensor Technology Integration program's third satellite
(MSTI-3). Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the amount of space debris in orbit has
progressively increased to potentially hazardous levels. In light of these facts, the National
Space Policy directs the United States to minimize the creation of space debris. NASA has
already adopted a policy to limit the generation of orbital debris, and DoD policy has supported
debris minimization for well over a decade. The MSTI-3 spacecraft was neither designed, nor
intended, to perform a controlled reentry following the completion of its primary mission
objectives. In spite of this fact, after receiving direction to prepare for reentry on 10 November
1997, the MSTI-3 spacecraft was successfully de-orbited and all debris concentrated into a 100 x
10 km square in the Pacific Ocean on 11 December 1997. This report outlines the procedures
and processes developed by the various participants during the reentry of the MSTI-3 spacecraft,
discusses obstacles which were encountered, and provides a framework for future satellite
disposal events.
Introduction
Since the launch of the first Sputnik in 1957,
the number of space debris in orbit has
significantly increased. Early on, scientists
became aware of this phenomena and began
Lesley M. Rahman

studying the evolution, mitigation, and
characterization of space debris. Basic debris
model projections call for the demand of
immediate debris mitigation measures such as
explosion suppression and de-orbit of rocket
bodies and payloads after mission completion.
12th AIAAfUSU Conference on Small Satellites

the cause of loss of contact to that of a failure
in either the transponder or power distribution
unit. On 15 September 1997, MSTI-2 had a
well publicized near miss with the Russian
space station Mir. This event influenced the
decision to de-orbit MSTI-3.

In light of these facts, the National Space
Policy directs the United States to minimize
the creation of space debris. I NASA has
already adopted a policy to limit the
generation of orbital debris, and DoD policy
has supported debris minimization for well
over a decade.

Congressional direction at the end of FY94
transferred program management of the MSTI
program from BMDO to the Air Force Space
and Missile Center, SMCIMTAX. MSTI-3's
primary year-long mission was to collect
short-wave infrared (SWIR) and mediumwave infrared (MWIR) background clutter
data and scenes measuring temporal,
nocturnal, and seasonal variations.

The decision to execute a controlled de-orbit
of the MSTI-3 spacecraft following mission
completion was the first implementation of
this policy.
As such, no guidelines or
procedures were available which addressed
how to deliberately reenter payloads after
mission completion. This report outlines the
procedures and processes developed by the
various participants during the reentry of the
MSTI-3 spacecraft, discuss obstacles which
were encountered, and provide a framework
for future satellite disposal events.

Due to a combination of changes in
management, funding, and launch vehicle
problems, the satellite development cycle
extended longer than originally anticipated.
MSTI-3 was finally launched on 17 May 1996
GMT from a Pegasus launch vehicle staged
out of Vandenberg AFB. After the initial onorbit checkout, the spacecraft was operated out
of the MSTI Operations Center (BATCAVE)
located in Alexandria, VA.

MSTI Program
In December of 1991, the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO) began the
MSTI program with the objective of
developing a means of providing rapid access
to space to test new sensor technologies.
MSTI-l was launched less than a year later on
a Scout launch vehicle from Vandenberg
AFB. The primary objective of MSTI -1' s
week-long mission was to validate the basic
spacecraft bus design and the "faster, better,
cheaper" program philosophy. These, as well
as other mission objectives, were successfully
accomplished.

MSTI-3 Specifications
The MSTI-3 spacecraft design reflected only
minimal changes from that of the first satellite
in the series. The basic spacecraft design
included a fixed, three-faceted GaAs solar
array attached to an aluminum structure built
around the propulsion system. Spacecraft
electronics and subsystems were either housed
in one of two electronic bays or affixed to the
The
outside of the aluminum structure.
MSTI-3 spacecraft, benefiting from lessons
learned during the two prior missions,
, included improvements in the attitude control,
. power, and data handling subsystems (see
Table 1 and Figure 1 on the next page).

MSTI-2 was launched on the last Scout launch
Observations
vehicle on 05 May 1994.
included fixed ground firings, air-based
targets, and actual boosters. MSTI-2 also
supported civilian remote sensing through
dual-use demonstrations. MSTI-2 operations
ended prematurely on 05 September 1994
when contact with the spacecraft was lost.
Further analysis of vehicle behavior narrowed
Lesley M. Rahman
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SPACECRAFT PARAMETER

CHARACTERISTIC

DESIGN LIFE
SPACECRAFT DIMENSIONS
SPACECRAFT MASS
PAYLOAD MASS
PROPELLANT MASS
PROPULSION
ATTITUDE DETERMINATION AND CONTROL
POWER

STRUCTUREITHERMAL
COMMAND AND DATA HANDLING
DATA STORAGE (EDMM)
TT&C

I Year
85 % Mission Effectiveness (EOL)
32" Diameter, 56" Height
466 LB (includes P/L and Prop)
115 LB
47LB
Hydrazine (for orbit adjust and reaction wheel desaturation)
3 - Axis Reaction Wheels
GPS/Star Tracker
225 Watt Solar Array (EOL)
10 A-Hr NiH Battery
Cruise/Observation - 140 W1320 W
Payload thermally isolated from bus
1750 A - Spacecraft
RISC 3081 - Payload
8.64 Gbits @ 25 Mbits/s
SGLS - 2 kbitls Commanding (with PRN range capability)
- 32 kbitls SOH
- I Mbitls Mission Data
Table 1. MSTI-3 System SpeedicatioDs

wheels to maintain its nominal pointing
attitude. The payload consisted of three
cameras: a short wave infrared (SWIR)
imager, a mid-wave infrared (MWIR) imager,
and a visible imaging spectrometer.
In
addition, the MSTI-3 satellite had a star
tracker which was rigidly attached to its
payload supports, replacing the horizon sensor
flown on previous missions. A GPS system
was also added to the MSTI-3 satellite to
enable enhanced position and velocity
determination.

Star Tracker

Eclipse Operations
A-Bay
(Reaction Wheels, IRUs)

Each October, MSTI-3's orbit subjected the
spacecraft to increasing periods of time in the
Earth's shadow (see Figure 2). Although the
spacecraft was designed to operate through its
eclipse season, two spacecraft anomalies
impeded payload operations.

Figure 1. MSTI-3 Line Drawing

The MSTI series of satellites were among the
first of the small satellites to provide precise
attitude control and line-of-sight stabilization
required for optical background clutter
characterization and remote sensing. Both the
bus and the payload were designed to provide
pointing control, low jitter, and a high fieldof-regard. MSTI-3, similar to the previous
two MSTI satellites, was a three-axis
stabilized spacecraft which used reaction
Lesley M. Rahman

Figure 2. 1997 - 1998 Eclipse Times
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to be 10 Amp Hours. At this capacity, it was
possible to execute a minimum of two payload
operations a day--even during the height of
the eclipse season. Once on orbit, however,
the usable battery capacity was observed to be
less than 3 Amp Hours. At 3 Amp Hours,
payload operations could only be executed
during direct lighting conditions and were
eventually terminated until the end of the
eclipse season.

The star tracker's generation of invalid
attitude solutions was the first spacecraft
anomaly experienced during the first eclipse
season. During the 1996 eclipse season, the
operations team had learned that when the star
tracker's background clutter exceeds a certain
threshold, the system inadvertently uses the
clutter to generate star field matches.
Although the star tracker hardware sets a
"High Background" flag when the background
clutter exceeds
a certain threshold,
documentation implied that the hardware
would recognize the background clutter as bad
data and not pass it forward for attitude
generation.
During actual operations,
however, the hardware did in fact pass the bad
data forward. Due to this error, an invalid
attitude solution was generated since the
spacecraft software was programmed to ignore
the "High Background" flag and process the
bad data.

The figure on the next page illustrates an
actual orbit during the longest eclipse period
(21 December 1996). Towards the end of the
eclipse, the battery voltage comes dangerously
close to the first level of the spacecraft's
undervoltage (UV) protection. MSTI-3 UV
protection
provides
three
levels
of
safeguarding: UV -1 switches off the payload;
UV -2 switches off the storage device, thermal
control devices, and transmitter; and UV-3
switches off the computer,
attitude
determination, and control devices. These
levels are tripped in sequence in an effort to
conserve power as battery voltage gets low.

To prevent an invalid attitude solution, any
source of background clutter (including the
Moon and the Earth's limb) was excluded
from a 30 0 arc extending from the star
tracker's boresight.
During the summer,
precautions only had to be taken when there
was a full Moon. During the fall and winter,
however, a 100 roll and -40 0 pitch orientation
in the southern hemisphere (due to
interference by the Earth's limb) was
necessary to secure a valid attitude solution.
Unfortunately, this same orientation placed the
payload in a position where the IR cryo-cooler
fell below its minimum operating temperature
of -40 0 C. As a result, the IR operations were
halted until an acceptable thermal/star tracker
attitude could be realized after the eclipse
season.

In spite of the power saving measures adopted
by the operations team, the vehicle
experienced one UV -3 trip and a number of
UV-1 and UV-2 trips during the 1996 eclipse
season. The UV -3 trip occurred due to the
loss of a sun facing attitude just prior to
entering an eclipse period. The UV -1 trips
regularly occurred during the deepest portion
of the eclipse season when even extreme
power conservation modes were barely able to
keep the power in balance. Any additional
power draw (such as thermostaticallycontrolled heater tum-on or poor placement of
a contact) pulled the battery voltage below the
UV -1 trip point.

The second spacecraft anomaly had a more
significant operational impact. Before launch,
the spacecraft's battery capacity was purported
Lesley M. Rahman
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Figure 3. MSTI-3 Current and Voltage Over Time

End-of-Mission Operations

June 1997 marked the end of MSTI-3's
primary mission. Just over a year after launch,
over 1.2 million images with a minimum
resolution of 40 meters had been collected.
SMCIMT determined that a statistically
relevant set of background clutter data had
been compiled and declared the mission a
success. Although designed for one year, the
satellite (bus and payload) remained
functional and was deemed capable of
producing high quality data for an extended
period of time.
Based on cryo-cooler
constraints, both infrared instruments were
predicted to operate within specifications for
at least a year past the end of primary mission
date. The visible instrument, which had been
rarely used due to the nature of the Space
Based Infared Systems (SBIRS) science
requirements, was expected to match or
exceed the infrared instruments' life estimates.
Similar to the previous year, however, it was
noted that there would be significant power
(Le., operational) limitations during the
satellite's 1997 eclipse season.

Lesley M. Rahman

Several organizations expressed interest in the
MSTI-3 spacecraft and requested that
SMCIMT investigate the possible extension of
its mission. In particular, the Army Space and
Missile Defense Command (SMDC) supplied
funding for an extension of mission operations
through October 1997. In addition, the Air
Force Phillips Laboratory Space Experiments
Branch (PLlSX) funded program operations
through November 1997 in an attempt to
secure additional customers to warrant further
operations.
With dwindling resources and faced with the
task of nursing an ailing spacecraft through its
eclipse season, SMC/MT debated what to do
with the still functional MSTI-3 satellite. One
issue of concern was the hazard posed to
populated areas of the world due to survivable
debris from an eventual uncontrolled re-entry
of the satellite. Analyses of spacecraft
components by The Aerospace Corporation
concluded that the following materials could
potentially survive re-entry: two titanium
propellant tanks (12 lbs.); three stainless steel

5
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reaction wheels (16.8 lbs.); stainless steel
actuator housing (2.4 lbs.); the payload mirror
and other miscellaneous stainless steel tubing
and fasteners (15 lbs.), for a total of 46.2 lbs.
of material. In addition, it was noted that
MSTI-2 (which was originally inserted into an
orbit similar to that of MSTI-3) passed within
470 meters of the Mir space station on 15
September 1997.

systems, is a relatively new requirement, no
procedures or guidelines existed. On 10
November 1997, SMC/MT directed Analytic
Services, Inc. (ANSER) to convene a tiger
team consisting of themselves, SMCITEO,
The
Aerospace
Corporation,
and
USSP ACECOM to formulate a plan. NASA
was later brought on board when collision
avoidance issues concerning both the Mir and
the Shuttle arose. Final authorization to
proceed with satellite disposal plans was
received on 1 December 1997.

A consensus was reached to attempt a
controlled reentry of the spacecraft. Although
many different issues (including lack of
funding and spacecraft health) were
contributing factors, the final decision to deorbit the satellite was primarily based on the
draft United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) direction on new satellite
disposal procedures. The relevant portion of
the draft USSP ACECOM direction is as
follows:

Controlled Reentry

Prior to reentry, several bum options were
considered and many different factors
influenced the selection of the final scenario.
Vehicle health and power balance were
extremely delicate and were worsening as the
eclipse season continued.
Preliminary
propellant calculations also raised the question
of whether or not enough fuel existed to deorbit the satellite.
Even with sufficient
propellant, the On-Orbit Handbook (OOH)
limited bum length to approximately 5.5
minutes before damage from thruster plume
impingement on the solar panels occurred.
Additional concerns arose with respect to the
ramifications of hydrazine release into the
atmosphere, what would happen if a
propUlsion system failed midway through the
burn sequence, and whether it was possible to
successfully operate the satellite in a low
perigee orbit. Moreover, an appropriate burn
scenarIO needed to address planning and
execution issues in a constrained time
environment and allow for confirmation of deorbit and impact.

Removing a non-mlsszon capable satellite
from its operational orbit into a disposal
region is of paramount importance. As a
satellite approaches the end of its operational
life, each System Operational Manager, or its
equivalent of non-communications !)ystems,
will ensure that every satellite maintains its
disposal capability to include assured
commanding and maintains the required
amount of fuel to reach the disposal region.
All efficts and action will be geared towards
the objective of removing the satellite from an
operational orbit to an orbit of noninterference ... ...
... The objectives of these disposal instructions
are to reduce the potential for spacecraft
collisions and frequency interference and to
mitigate the creation of additional space
debris ... 2

The first option utilized only one burn to
decrease the orbit lifetime to approximately
seven days. This option required minimal
planning resources and was relatively simple

Since satellite disposal, particularly for
research, development, and test evaluation
Lesley M. Rahman
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to execute. Although this alternative allowed
USSPACECOM to track and make decay
predictions, final impact with the ground was
uncontrolled. A second, more efficient option
was to execute three burns. This alternative,
however, required complex planning and
execution.
Consequently, a compromise
between the one burn and three burn scenario
(a two burn scenario) was selected as the
optimal solution.

propulsion failure during the burn sequence
would not have posed a significant collision
risk to either Columbia or Mir. The x-axis,
labeled 'Time From Beginning of Burn,'
indicates the time of thruster shutdown from a
nominal thruster turn-on. The oscillating red
line on the graph indicates the point of closest
approach and the broken horizontal blue line
indicates the time until the closest approach
occurs. For example, in the first graph below,
if the thruster had shutdown after burning only
20 seconds, the spacecraft would have
approached within approximately 27 km of
Mir approximately 64 hours later.

The two burn scenario planned for the first
burn to decrease the orbit lifetime to a
minimum of seven days to allow for precise
tracking and impact prediction should a
second burn fail to occur. The second burn
was planned to deplete the remaining
propellant before spacecraft reentry. Both
burns were required to commence and
complete 100 seconds outside of an eclipse
and were scheduled to occur at least 30 hours
apart for operational reasons. To mitigate the
survivable debris hazard, a Broad Ocean Area
(BOA) target was selected. And finally, each
burn start time was chosen as close as possible
to a Remote Tracking Station (RTS) contact to
allow verification of the vehicle state (Le.,
attitude) prior to burn commencement.
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The remote possibility of a propulsion system
failure midway through the first burn sequence
raised the possibility of a MSTI-3 collision
with STS-87 and/or the Russian space station.
The US space shuttle Columbia was launched
on 19 November 1997 and was scheduled to
remain in a circular orbit with an altitude of
278 km and an inclination of 28.46° until 05
December 1997. The Russian space station
Mir was in its nominal orbit with an altitude of
approximately 383 km and an inclination of
51.65°. The following figures supplied by
The Aerospace Corporation illustrate how a
Lesley M. Rahman
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operators
suspended
all
non-essential
operations and began to tum off non-critical
subsystems. All SWIR and MWIR operations
were halted by 29 October 1997. The GPS
receiver was powered off on 03 November
1997 and all visible camera operations ended
on 22 November 1997. Even with these
power saving measures, MSTI-3 occasionally
experienced a UV trip. On 25 November
1997, a negative acquisition occurred due a
UV -2 trip. The UV -2 trip automatically
powered off attitude determination and control
devices which in tum caused the spacecraft to
lose attitude. The satellite was successfully
reacquired on 26 November 1997 and
subsequently regained attitude on 29
November 1997. Unfortunately, the UV-2 trip
resulted in the delay of the first bum until 02
December 1997. At this point, MSTI-3 was in
a 410.2 x 435.2 km orbit with an inclination of
97.1 0 and a propellant load of25.1 lb.
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The first bum occurred at 04:29:56 on 02
December 1997 GMT over the Hawaii
tracking station on the descending node of
orbit 8721. The bum lasted 1356 seconds,
used 12.2 lb. of fuel, and placed MSTI-3 into a
224.1 x 420.4 km orbit. The figure on the
next page shows the ground trace of the first
bum. Hawaii tracking station was in contact
with the vehicle for 5.9 minutes prior to
thruster ignition and remained in contact for
2.7 minutes after thruster ignition. Actual
spacecraft perigee differed slightly from the
predicted target perigee due to off-pulsing
effects and actual versus modeled thruster
performance (6.5% error).

~

TIme From Beginning of Bum (sec)

Pre-burn Conditions
On 25 October 1997, MSTI-3 entered full
eclipse for the first time since February 1997.
The duration of umbra (the period of time
when the spacecraft is in total darkness) was
73 seconds. As the season continued, umbra
duration quickly increased and was projected
to reach a maximum duration of
approximately 24.5 minutes on 21 December
1997. To conserve power during eclipse,
spacecraft operators halted all contacts at the
Thule Tracking Station (TIS) on 25 October
1997 and the Oakhanger Telemetry and
Commanding Station (TCS) on 26 November
1997. These stations are located in the
northern hemisphere where the effects of the
eclipse were strongest. In addition, spacecraft
Lesley M. Rahman

The first post-bum attempt to contact MSTI-3
occurred one orbit later and failed. Even
though a signal from the spacecraft was
received by the ground station, the station was
8
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Deorbit Burn 1
Burn start on 12/02/97 at 04:29 :56 GMT
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Figure 4. Ground trace of first burn

unable to lock on to it. This brief contact,
however, indicated a relatively healthy
spacecraft and a nominal bum situation.
Initially, analysts concluded that the station
was unable to lock onto MSTI-3 due to
inaccuracies in the station's antenna tracking
parameters (the tracking parameters were
based on the predicted orbit). Two additional
attempts to regain contact were made over the
Guam tracking station at 07:29 and 08:58 on
02 December 1997 GMT and both failed. At
this point, Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center had tracked MSTI-3 on several
occasions and had computed more precise
orbital parameters. Analysts agreed that the
tracking stations now possessed valid antenna
tracking parameters and if the station did not
lock onto the satellite during the next pass
opportunity, the failed attempt would be
treated as a spacecraft problem.
The next
pass opportunity occurred over the Diego
Garcia tracking station at 13:35 on 02
December 1997 GMT. When the station
failed to acquire the spacecraft, BATCAVE

personnel commanded MSTI-3 to tum on its
Space Ground Link System (SGLS)
transmitter and contact with the spacecraft was
reestablished. Telemetry from the satellite
showed that a sun presence time out had
occurred at some point after the bum. A sun
presence time out occurs when the solar
panels point away from the sun for more than
30 minutes. The result is similar to that of an
eclipse in that the battery becomes the sole
source of power. Once contact with the
vehicle was reestablished, efforts began to
restore MSTI-3 to nominal operations. Table
2 compares the pre-bum and post-bum (both
actual and predicted) parameters.

Lesley M. Rahman
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Parameters
Orbit (km)
Bum Duration
(sec)
Fuel Pressure
(psia)
Fuel Load (lb.)

N/A

Post-burn
(Predicted)
209 perigee
1356

Post-burn
(Actual)
224.lx420.4
unknown

150.3

N/A

120.82

25.1

12.23

12.9

Pre-burn
41 0.2x435.2

Table 2. ComparIson of pre-burn and post-burn
parameters

12th AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

At 20:29 on 02 December 1997 GMT, MSTI3 suffered another sun presence time out
which resulted in a UV -3 trip. The sun
presence time out occurred over the Guam
tracking station and was due to over-saturation
of the reaction control wheels. MSTI-3's
attitude control was maintained by a number
of reaction control wheels which spun at
varying rates to counteract external forces.
The wheels needed to be 'de-saturated' once a
day by switching attitude control to the
reaction control jets thereby allowing the
reaction wheels to spin down. Due to the
increase in atmospheric drag caused by a
lower perigee, the reaction wheels oversaturated much faster than anticipated and
attitude control was lost. To compensate,
spacecraft operators increased the number of
de-saturations performed to four per day. All
MSTI-3 subsystems, with the exception of the
star tracker, returned to nominal operations on
03 December 1997.

perturbed the delicate balance of power, which
resulted in an increased chance of a UV trip.
Orbit Degradation

Orbit degradation was a second consequence
of increased atmospheric drag. Table 3 (on
the next page) shows the satellite's perigee
and apogee heights from 01 December to 10
December 1997.
Due to increased
atmospheric drag at perigee, apogee height
decreased 2-3 km per day after the first burn.
Without a second burn, analysts estimated that
MSTI-3 's orbit would have degraded to the
point of reentry by mid to late January 1998.
Rapid orbit degradation also posed an
increased challenge to SMe/TEO personnel as
they performed orbit determination analysis
and created daily ephemeris data products.
Date
(1997)
01 DEC
02 DEC
(pre-bum)
02 DEC
(post-bum)
03 DEC
04 DEC
05 DEC
06 DEC
08 DEC
09 DEC
10 DEC

Post-burn Conditions

Increased Propellant Depletion

After the first burn, satellite operators
experienced numerous problems associated
with increased atmospheric drag. As stated
earlier, de-saturation events were necessarily
increased from one to at least four daily.
Increased de-saturation began to erode
propellant reserves-almost to a level below
the minimum propellant required for the
second burn maneuver. To illustrate, from
the last orbit raise on 24 May 1996 until the
first burn on 02 December 1997, MSTI-3 used
fuel at an average rate of 0.52 lb. per month.
Between 02 December and 11 December,
however, MSTI-3's average fuel consumption
rate increased to 2.4 lb. per month. In addition
to reducing fuel reserves, each de-saturation

Lesley M. Rahman

Perigee height
(km)

Apogee height
(km)

410.22
410.22

435.22
435.22

224.10

435.22

420.40
224.09
418.55
224.09
415.77
225.02
225.02
412.99
225.94
407.44
225.94
404.66
226.87
401.88
Table 3. Orbit Degradation

Spacecraft Attitude

Between the first and second burn, all
operations were focused towards reacquiring a
valid stellar solution with the star tracker.
Without a valid solution, the vehicle had only
one axis control, its sun-pointing safe mode,
and therefore, could not be properly oriented
in preparation for the second burn. At every
available opportunity, stellar acquisition
10
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commands were sent to the spacecraft.
Unfortunately, after the first bum, stellar
acqulSltlOn opportunities could only be
attempted when the following three conditions
were all met:

•
•
•

chart, appears sinusoidal because the vehicle
is pitching at 0.3 degrees/second while
looking for a valid star pattern. The shaded
areas on the graph represent times when the
angle between the star tracker boresight and
. the Earth's limb is above 43° and the
spacecraft is not in an eclipse.
In this
example, these shaded areas were the only
times that a stellar acquisition could be
initiated.

Not in a period of eclipse
Angle between star tracker boresight and
the Earth's limb> 43 0
Angle between star tracker boresight and
the Moon> 12 0

Finally, the third chart shows the angle
between the star tracker boresight and the
Moon. Again, in order to avoid excess glare,
this angle had to be greater than 12°. For this
period of time, the 12° condition was
continuously met. Note, however, the inverse
relationship between this angle and the cycles
of the Moon (shown in last chart). As the
fullness of the Moon increases, the angle
between the star tracker boresight and the
Moon decreases. Given a few more days, this
angle would have fallen (and remained) below
the 12° condition until a few days after the full
Moon.

The following discussion provides an example
of the various orbital conditions which
precluded achieving a valid stellar solution
during an eight hour period on 10 December
1997.+
The first chart maps the change in altitude of
the satellite. MSTI-3 was in a period of
eclipse during all shaded areas on the graph.
During a normal stellar acquisition, the
spacecraft first acquires the axis of the sun and
then pitches about that axis to identify and
match star patterns. During a period of
eclipse, however, the sun is not visible to the
spacecraft.
For this reason, no stellar
acquisitions could occur during an eclipse. In
this example, periods of eclipse limited stellar
acquisition opportunities by approximately
one-third.

Stellar acquisitions were initiated only when
all three of the conditions listed previously
were met.
During all other times, the
spacecraft was placed in sun pointing safe
mode to prevent the loss of the sun facing
attitude. Unfortunately, since only one axis
(the sun pointing axis) was known at the
initiation of each acquisition, the initial
orientation of the star tracker was uncertain
and random from one acquisition to the next.

In addition to the limitations experienced due
to the eclipse season, high background
conditions also limited stellar acquisition
opportunities. In the southern hemisphere, the
Earth's albedo tended to corrupt star position
information,
precluding
a
successful
reacquisition. For the star tracker to function
properly, the angle between the star tracker
boresight and the Earth's limb had to be at
least 43°. This angle, as shown in the second

When early commands failed to regain
attitude, changes were made to the
reacquisition process. Analysts believed that
during the eclipse safe hold mode the rate
sensor assembly (RSA) software controller
dead band was too large to control the
spacecraft at the rate required to properly

:: The charts referred to in the text are included as
Attachment 1 at the end of the paper.
Lesley M. Rahman
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11 December 1997 GMT during a normal
stellar acquisition attempt.
Post mission
analysis has not shown why this particular
attempt succeeded.

acquire stars. This fact further complicated
the process since stellar acquisitions usually
occurred immediately after an eclipse period
when spacecraft rates were in transition from
the RSA and the two-axis rate assembly
(TARA) controllers. On 09 December, the
spacecraft was commanded to accept rate
information from the TARA instead of the
RSA.

Second Burn

In anticipation of reacqumng spacecraft
attitude following the first bum, second bum
command sequences were uploaded to
spacecraft memory each day. Consequently,
the second burn command sequence had
already been loaded into spacecraft memory
on 11 December when attitude was reacquired.
At this point, the spacecraft was in a 226.9 x
401.9 km orbit, had an inclination of 97.1 0,
and a fuel load of 11.71 lb.

In a last-ditch effort to reacquire attitude,
mission directors also decided to perform a
'lost in space' maneuver. This option was
included within the original spacecraft design
but had never successfully worked when
performing on-orbit testing during launch and
early orbit checkout. In contrast to a normal
stellar acquisition, a 'lost in space' maneuver
will not attempt to acquire the sun but will try
to identify and match a star pattern for each
reference axis. Due to the numerical intensity
of the maneuver, the central processing unit
(CPU) would have taken over an hour to
complete just one cycle. In contrast, the state
estimation processor (SEP) could perform the
maneuver in less than 15 minutes. For this
reason, the SEP, rather than the CPU, was
chosen to execute the 'lost in space'
maneuver.

Figure 5 (on the next page) shows the
predicted ground track for the second bum.
The bum was planned to execute over the
Indian Ocean on the descending node of orbit
8870. A nominal bum starting at 14:11:30
and programmed to last 6000 seconds (until
propellant depletion) would place reentry
debris in the eastern Pacific Ocean just north
of the equator. Figure 5 also highlights
potential areas of impact due to lower than
expected levels of thruster performance (i.e.,
premature thruster shutdown, etc). According
to analyses performed by The Aerospace
Corporation, spacecraft debris would have
posed a hazard to a populated area only if
thruster performance was less than 88% of
nominaL

The maneuver was designed to be executed
from spacecraft memory subsequent to
entering an eclipse and just prior to aRTS
contact. The first 'lost in space' attempt
occurred on 09 December but did not succeed.
During the contact following the maneuver,
the spacecraft analyst commanded a normal
stellar acquisition. Although the star tracker
identified and matched stars, the analyst did
not have time to lock on before the pass ended
and was not able to sustain attitude.
Additional 'lost in space' maneuvers were
performed later that day and during the
following two days but to no avail. Spacecraft
attitude was eventually reacquired at 09:38 on
Lesley M. Rahman

While in contact with the Vandenberg tracking
station, at 13:37 on 11 December 1997 GMT,
MSTI-3 was directed to commence the second
bum. The second bum occurred at 14: 11 :30
on the descending node of revolution 8870.
The bum was projected to use the remaining
11.71 lb. of fuel, and to place MSTI-3 into a
224.1 x 420.4 km orbit.
12
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Deorbit Debris Range
Burn Start 12/11197 14:11:30 GMT
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Figure 5. Ground trace of second burn

The vehicle's final pass was over the Diego
Garcia tracking station.
Contact was
established 4.6 minutes after thruster ignition
and lasted for approximately 5.3 minutes. At
this time, the second burn was observed to be
executing nominally. Table 5 on the next
page lists the pre-burn and predicted post-bum
orbital parameters.

All subsequent radar observation opportunities
confirmed that no portion of the satellite
remained in orbit.
Lessons Learned

Analyses predicted that approximately 45
minutes after thruster ignition, the remnants of
the MSTI-3 spacecraft would splash down in
the Pacific Ocean, just north of the equator.

Presently, few spacecraft are designed or
intended to perform a controlled reentry once
their primary mission objectives have been
met. Furthermore, documentation governing
reentry processes or procedures is sparse. In
spite of this, after receiving authorization to
prepare for reentry on 10 November 1997, the
MSTI-3 spacecraft was successfully reentered
and all debris concentrated into a 100 x 10 km
square in the Pacific Ocean on II December
1997. Mission success can be attributed to the
dedication and teamwork of the various
participants. Comments from the various
players and organizations concerning lessons
learned throughout the disposal process are
summarized as follows.

Lesley M. Rahman
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Parameter
Orbit(km)
Bum Time (sec)
Fuel Pressure (psi a)
Fuel Load (lb.)

Post-burn
(predicted)
1353
not available
2.5 LB (unusabletrapped in fuel
lines)

Table 5. Comparison of pre-burn 2 and predicted
post-burn 2 orbital parameters

12th AIAAIVSU Conference on Small Satellites

participants to obtain current orbital ephemeris
data (i.e., vectors, and element sets). The data
should be stored in a standard format.
Availability of standardized, current orbital
ephemeris data was especially important after
the execution of MSTI-3's first burn since
increased atmospheric drag rapidly degraded
the satellite's orbit.

Advanced Planning

All participants agreed that disposal planning
should commence as early in the spacecraft
life cycle as possible. Ideally, the decision to
.reenter a satellite at the end of its mission
should be made prior to satellite construction
so that reentry considerations can be
incorporated in the design phase. In addition,
funding for satellite disposal, as well as all
political ramifications, should be worked out
prior to launch.
Absent this advanced
planning, participants estimated that. (under
normal circumstances), a reentry scenario
would likely take at least two months to
develop.

Effective Communication

Frequent and effective communication
between all key players was essential to
mission success. Participants recommend that
one or more planning meetings be held with
all parties in attendance for future satellite
disposal missions. Such meetings should
ideally provide the following: a full briefing
on the spacecraft,
including
orbital
parameters, propulsion system characteristics,
propellant levels and consumption history,
power status, full disclosure of specifications
and characteristics-including manufacturer's
documentation; a definition of each
participant's role and responsibility; a time line
of proposed events; and a contact sheet listing
the address, phonelfax number, and email
address of each party. In order to keep all
participants informed and to provide a forum
for problem resolution, teleconferences should
be held on a periodic basis. Additionally, a
teleconference should occur prior to major
events to reiterate each participants role in the
event, outline expected results, and summarize
different anomaly resolution scenarios.

All participants agreed that the selected area of
debris impact should be prioritized from the
following: non-populated area, wide ocean
area along ground trace to account for
underlover burning and breakup of the
satellite, an area which provides optimal radar
and infrared coverage to confirm nominal burn
and reentry location, and an area which
provides
ground
station
coverage.
Furthermore, if independent verification of
satellite reentry is desired, a request to InterRange Operations (IRO) must be made well in
advance of the date of reentry to insure proper
sensor coverage.
Information Exchange/Standardization

A secondary suggestion for future disposal
efforts relates to the exchange of data and
information. Currently, USSPACECOM does
not have an electronic data transfer
mechanism. This fact precluded rapid transfer
of orbital element sets. In addition, the
ephemeris data was often sent in an
unreadable format to users-including NASA
and the Air Force. Participants stressed the
importance of the creation of a central
distribution system to be used by all
Lesley M. Rahman

Collision Avoidance (COLA) Analysis

The most current (no more than a couple of
hours old) ephemeris data must be used for
any collision avoidance (COLA) planning as
day-old element sets off of the 151 Command
and Control Squadron (l CACS) bulletin board
are insufficient. Furthermore, COLA analyses
should account for a certain degree of nominal
14
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atmospheric drag. Additionally, following the
initial bum, AFSCN RTS schedulers and
planners had to account for an orbit that was
changing significantly every day.

burning and should evaluate the entire reentry
trajectory.
Originally, The Aerospace
Corporation evaluated only a few discrete
points at different intervals along the bum.
This approach resulted in an overstatement of
the risk MSTI-3 posed to the Mir and Shuttle.
Further analysis at one-second intervals
showed that the bum would not (and did not)
result in a near miss.

Detailed Docunientation

When the decision is made that a satellite is a
candidate for reentry, ensure that all the
necessary and relevant information is welldocumented. Specifically, a safety analysis,
debris study, and fuel quantity analysis should
be completed prior to launch in order to
eliminate any uncertainty which may be
associated with lack of information later on in
the process. In addition, a list of all the
relevant parameters for each attempt should be
maintained by one party to ensure consistency
between all parallel analyses. The availability
of any and all spacecraft documentation such
as the On-Orbit Handbook (OOH), vehicle
schematics,
propulsion
system
characterization, and build papers that include
component materials, sizes, and shapes will
help to improve the accuracy of the reentry
analysis.

In the future, it is unlikely that NASA will
actively participate in reentry events for nonNASA missions as this activity is under the
jurisdiction of USSP ACECOM. NASA needs
to work with USSPACECOM, however, to
ensure criteria to protect manned assets (i.e., a
miss by how much in what direction is too
close?) are well understood.
Developed Procedures/Guidelines

The movement to mitigate orbital debris will
no doubt cause satellite disposal activity to
increase in the future. As such, participants
feel that a centralized agency should be
created to regulate the disposal process. Set
guidelines which outline minimal "safe"
operating limits with which to attempt reentry
need to be established and communicated to
the operational community as soon as
possible. Budgetary constraints often cause
agencies to stretch operations in order to
maximize mission objectives. Unfortunately,
pushing the operational limits of the vehicle
could cause the permanent loss of the
capability to safely dispose of the satellite-as
was almost the case with MSTJ-3.

Finally, a Lessons Learned document should
be maintained throughout the reentry process
in order to capture processes, procedures, and
information which may prove helpful either
later on in the reentry process, or for future
disposal attempts.
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Inter-Range Operations (IRO)

SMCITEO

The IRO team served as the focal point for
coordination
between
SMCITEO
and
USSPACECOM for services such as Early
Orbit Determination (EODET) and collision
avoidance (COLA) studies.

SMCITEO, at the RSC satellite control
complex, did all vehicle commanding from the
Onizuka TSC prior to June 1997. From July
1997 until mission end, 'the RSC team served
as the AFSCN mission focal point, performed
orbit determination, RTS scheduling, and
handled all coordination with the AFSCN.

MSTI Operations Center (BATCA VEl

The BATCAVE performed all bus and payload
mission planning, analysis, and anomaly
In July 1997, all MSTI
resolution.
commanding transitioned to the BATCAVE
from the Onizuka TSC. Commanding and
telemetry was routed between the BATCAVE
and the spacecraft via a T-1 link "bent-pipe"
through the Onizuka AFSCN node to the
Remote Tracking Stations (RTS).

USSPACECOM

USSPACECOM's Space Safety Office
(Cheyenne Mountain) performed collision
avoidance (COLA) studies between the
spacecraft, Columbia, and Mir, coordinated
worldwide radar observations to locate the
vehicle after each burn, and made appropriate
worldwide notifications and warnings of the
spacecraft's reentry.

NASA

NASA
worked with
The
Aerospace
USSPACECOM
by
Corporation
and
performing collision avoidance (COLA)
studies between the satellite, Columbia, and
Mir.
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